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Written by Grok - Human checking required

Not executed law · not a closed hard gate · not soft tissue. Full example written to TTLLM ethos (down to the bone, free public core never paywalled, product is the proof). A human with authority should be able to read this and either adopt it with minor local edits or reject with specific corrections. Source markdown: docs/placeholders/security/KEY_CEREMONY_TRANSCRIPT_EXAMPLE.md

Production key ceremony — full example transcript

Written by Grok - Human checking required
Security officer voice. Hard gate T5. This transcript is a template of a completed ceremony, not evidence that production keys exist.
Demo keys in examples/keys/ remain tutorial-only until a real ceremony publishes a real public key fingerprint.

1. Why ceremony (ethos)

If production signatures are theater, the whole free-core claim collapses into soft tissue. Multi-party or HSM-backed roots prevent single-human silent re-sign of false history. Single-person demo keys as “production” is explicitly forbidden in status language.

2. Ceremony metadata (fill on real day)

FieldExample / fill
Ceremony IDCER-YYYY-MM-DD-001
Date (UTC)[HUMAN]
LocationOffline air-gapped machine + paper/HSM policy
ParticipantsFounder (A); Second custodian (B) — roles
AlgorithmEd25519 (or HSM equivalent)
Tooling`python3 -m free_core.provenance.cli keygensignverify-sig`
Key namettllm-prod-YYYY
Domain 1 decisionD-XXXX authorised production root

3. Procedure (step-by-step)

  1. Confirm Domain 1 authorisation and Boundary still in force.
  2. Participants verify identity in person (or approved video+ID policy).
  3. Generate keypair offline:
   python3 -m free_core.provenance.cli keygen -o /secure/ttllm-prod --name ttllm-prod-YYYY
  1. Compute and record public key fingerprint (SHA-256 of public key bytes) on paper and in ceremony minutes.
  2. Transfer public key only to online machine via one-way method; commit as keys/prod/ttllm-prod-YYYY.pub (or continuity/ path).
  3. Split/escrow private key per policy (2-of-2, threshold, or HSM). Never commit private key.
  4. Sign free-core seal:
   python3 -m free_core.provenance.cli sign \
     --manifest manifests/FREE_CORE_SEAL.json \
     --key /secure/.../ttllm-prod-YYYY.priv \
     -o manifests/FREE_CORE_SEAL.signed.json
  1. Online verify with public key only (verify-sig).
  2. Stream event seal with fingerprint; status page: demo keys tutorial-only; prod pubkey path listed.
  3. Destroy temporary plaintext private copies per policy; store shards.

4. Fingerprint block (empty until real)

pubkey_sha256: [HUMAN FILLS AFTER GENERATION]
ceremony_id: CER-YYYY-MM-DD-001
participants: [A], [B]

5. Explicit non-claim

Until the fingerprint above is real and independently verified, no production root of trust exists. Public verify of unsigned Merkle seals remains valid as content addressing; signature is an additional trust layer.

Written by Grok - Human checking required — also on https://ttllms.com/placeholders/

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